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In African health care the "miracle of the market" has not occurred. Pa-
tients exhibit willingness to pay for health care and yet practitioners are unable
to sell their services. Simultaneously non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
are running successful health facilities for which patients are willing to pay.
We develop a model of the demand for health care in the presence of asym-
metric information that allows us to view African health care in the framework
of the New Institutional Economics literature. We use previously published
empirical results to support the validity of this view and show that NGOs have
the institutional capacity to deliver high quality health care, whereas private
practitioners, even with good intentions, will not easily succeed.
Having arrived at the well documented conclusion that NGOs provide high
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extend the provision of health services.
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1 Introduction
With Africa in prolonged economic crisis, most of its states in fiscal collapse, and
pressures from the World Bank for Structural Adjustment, most sectors of the con-
tinent's economies have been increasingly privatized. All too frequently, however,
the "miracle of the market" has not followed. This failure is particularly acute in
the health sector. It is widely acknowledged that markets for health everywhere are
troubled with imperfect information. The patient cannot assess the appropriateness
and quality of the activities of the health practitioner. Therefore it is no surprise
that free markets and spot contracts do not lead to an efficiently functioning market
for health care.
There are many potential solutions to problems of asymmetric information. With
a few important exceptions, however, the only consistently functioning solution in
Africa is non-governmental organization (NGO) health systems. Science-based pri-
vate practice is not well established and government services are almost universally
of poor quality, despite the fact that NGO personnel are hired from the same med-
ical schools and often paid less than their government counterparts. The success
of NGOs is not a new result; however we explain their success by appeal to the-
ory. This allows us to make policy conclusions about asymmetric information in the
market for health care in general, the possibility for private markets and the future
role of NGOs in this market.
Throughout most of Sub-Saharan Africa there is very little private (for profit)
provision of health care, despite great cut-backs in government provision (Bennett
et al. 1997, Hanson and Berman 1998). Most countries have no private sector of
which to speak. Some countries have done better; in Kenya 23% of health facilities
are private and in Ghana this figure reaches 40%. However, even these facilities do
not appear to be serving the expected function in health care. "In Kenya 94 per
cent of private for-profit facilities are below the health center level, compared with
79 per cent in the mission sector and 60 per cent in the public sector" (Berman et al.
(1995a) as reported in McPake (1997, p. 26)). It appears that private providers most
often are selling drugs or clinical tools, but not diagnostic services; they are acting as
pharmacists not doctors. This is confirmed by the disparity between hospital beds
and percentage of total expenditure. In Zambia, for example, 0.2% of hospital beds
but 22% of total health expenditure is in the private sector (Berman et al. (1995b)
as reported in McPake (1997, p. 25)). In this respect, at least, privatization reforms
have led to the proverbial "race to the bottom," where private providers exist only
in small profitable market niches and the majority of health care needs are not being
satisfied by this sector.
At the same time however, NGOs provide significant portions of health care
services in Africa and are generally seen as being of high quality. Ghanaian NGOs
provide 40% of clinical care needs, 27% of hospital beds and 35% of outpatient
services. In Tanzania NGOs provide half of all hospitals and beds and receive half
of all curative visits: In Zimbabwe they supply 35% of all hospital beds and 96% of
NGO facilities are located in disadvantaged rural areas. (Gilson et al. 1997). These
providers are not serving only small market niches.
Arrow (1963, pg 965) is the first among many authors to suggest that non-profit
hospitals serve a special role in the health care market and that this is due to
asymmetric information. He suggested that patients prefer organizations that are
not maximizing profits when they are unable to judge quality directly, supposing
that the profit motive has adverse consequences when the patient has imperfect
information about quality. As we have stated, there are few private practitioners in
Africa so the relevant comparison usually is not between profit and not-for-profit
but between governmental and non-governmental organizations. We seek to explain
why employees who are otherwise identical (in terms of skill, training and for the
most part their instinct to seek profit) behave and are perceived to behave in such
different manners depending on their employer's identity. It is not enough to say
that non-profits maximize something other than profit; we must explain how they
manage to extend the proper incentives to their personnel.
We introduce three categories of mechanisms or institutions that could poten-
tially resolve these problems and discuss why we believe only NGOs are currently
solving the problem on an effective scale. The first type of mechanisms are au-
tonomous outcome-contingent contracts. Such contracts can be formed between
any patient-provider pair if the correct environment exists. The fabled "pay only
if cured" contract of Dranove and White (1987, pg 409) is one such mechanism.
Another is contracts with the implicit sanction of malpractice suits against practi-
tioners. Repeated interactions or the expectation of repeated interaction can also
fall under this category. Repeated patronage is dependent on the observation of a
series of outcomes and an implicit contract can be formed in which future patronage
is contingent on past outcomes. The pay-only-if-cured contract, however, depends
on the verifiability of outcomes and malpractice suits depend, at the very least, on
the existence of functioning courts. If these exogenous conditions do not exist then
autonomous contracts cannot be formed. The absence of effective courts rules out
malpractice as a mechanism for insuring quality in Africa but we will show that the
pay-only-if-cured contract does exist under some circumscribed conditions. Im-
plicit contracts or repeated patronage are common in African veterinary care but
we will show why their success is unlikely to extend to human health care.
There is also the potential for practitioner-coordinated contracts, requiring some
degree of coordination between practitioners. Examples are professional self-regulation
and referral networks, both of which take advantage of the fact that other practi-
tioners do not face the same disadvantage as the patient in evaluating effort. Since
practitioners suffer when they are unable to sell their services they could benefit from
publicly credible commitments to provide high levels of effort. These networks or
professional bodies could, in theory, be formed by providers themselves and not rely
on outside organizations (such as the government) for their existence. Furthermore
they present practitioners with incentives to provide effort that are independent
of any contract with patients. These institutions do not generally exist in Africa
and we will present empirical evidence that self-regulation, at least, is not likely to
become an important institution.
A third type of institution is the hierarchically-enforced contract, which relies on
pre-existing organizations. In Africa the relevant organizations are the government
and NGOs, generally churches and missions. We claim that both types of orga-
nization use the mechanism of hierarchical supervision. We find strong evidence
that existing mission health facilities are effectively using this mechanism to deliver
high quality health care that resolves, to some degree, the problems of agency. On
the other hand, governments, though using the same institution, fail to employ it
effectively and generally provide low quality care despite great expense in training,
facilities, and supplies.
In the following Section of this paper we will introduce a model of health care
seeking behavior with asymmetric information. In Section 3 we examine the poten-
tial solutions to asymmetric information suggested by the literature. We weigh these
solutions against empirical evidence. The majority of this evidence is drawn from
a seven country African collaborative project in which we participated (Leonard,
ed 1999). The project examined the changing markets for both human and animal
health care on the continent, with independent research projects in each country.
Although we concentrate on medical care for humans, we also use research done on
veterinary medicine. The biological science underlying the two professions is nearly
identical and they are organized in very similar ways. Veterinary care in Africa is
particularly interesting, because over the last dozen years it has moved rapidly from
being more dominated by the state than human health was to now being substan-
tially more private. The health and veterinary markets in Africa therefore nicely
illuminate one another.1 In Section 4 we examine empirical evidence specifically
concerning NGOs and the ramifications of policy towards NGOs. We conclude in
Section 5.
2 Asymmetric Information in Health Care
Economic theorizing about health care implicitly derives from the "medical model"
of Parsons (1951, Chap. 10). Parsons saw the patient as an inadequately informed
and hence passive recipient of care from an omniscient physician. In contrast, the
empirical literature on health care in Africa demonstrates quite conclusively that
the sick are not passive in their use of the health care system but instead are actively
making choices between an array of options. The choices made often are explained
by factors unrelated to medicine, such as price and distance, or by static attributes
of the facilities, such as availability of drugs or perceived quality (Burkina Faso:
Nougtara et al. (1989); Cameroun: Litvack and Bodart (1993); Ghana: Waddington
and Enyimayew (1989); Nigeria: Omorodion (1993) and Stock (1983); Swaziland:
^or more on the mutual relevance of veterinary and human medicine, especially in Africa,
see Schwabe (1984); Majok and Schwabe (1996, p. 128).
Yoder (1989); and Tanzania: Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992)). None of these factors
contradict the image of the sick as passive recipients of health care from providers
whose methods of operation are obscured in a 'black box.' Another group of stud-
ies, however, indicates that choice is being guided by the character or severity of
the illness (Benin: Bichmann et al. (1991); Burkina Faso: Sauerborn et al. (1989);
Kenya: Mwabu (1986); and Cameroun: Leonard (1998a), Ndeso-Atanga (1999)).
Sometimes these studies cast doubt on the appropriateness of the judgements being
made (Mali: Coppo et al. (1992)), but as a group this body of research suggests that
the sick may be less ignorant about the kinds of medical treatment they require than
the traditional medical model has implied.
Thus we develop a model of health care in which, although the patient is unable
to evaluate what is being done for her health, she does have some information about
the characteristics of the condition under which she suffers. This information will
allow her to make some educated decisions about which type of practitioner is most
likely to provide the inputs she needs in health care.
2.1 The Health Production Technology
We begin with an individual who has fallen sick.2 She knows her illness condition
(the collection of symptoms) but not her diagnosis. We assume that there are only
two outcomes to health interventions; a good outcome and a bad outcome (full re-
covery and no recovery, for example). The characteristics of these outcomes depend
only on the disease condition and not on any characteristics of the patient or the
practitioner she visits. The probability of achieving either outcome is determined by
two binomial distributions; the 'true diagnosis' distribution and the 'false diagnosis'
distribution. We motivate these distributions as follows: if the patient's condition
is correctly diagnosed, and the proper treatment regime is prescribed, understood
and followed, the patient will have a set probability of full recovery. If the diagnosis
is incorrect the patient faces a different (lower) probability of recovery. These two
distributions contain the key source of 'error' in health care that allow us to model
health care as a principal-agent problem. In health, often everything is done as it
2This exposition is presented with greater rigor in the Appendix.
should and the patient does not recover — the probability of recovery for the 'true
diagnosis' distribution is not generally one. On the other hand patients frequently
recover when nothing has been done for their health (or when incorrect actions have
been taken) — the probability of recovery for the 'false diagnosis distribution' is not
zero.
Health care is a set of technologies that probabilistically span these two distribu-
tions. A 'better' technology is one that has a higher probability of choosing the 'true
diagnosis' distribution than another technology. The 'best' technology has a 100%
chance of correct diagnosis and leads to the highest possible chance of recovery (not
generally one). The 'worst' technology has a 100% chance of choosing among the
incorrect diagnoses and leads to the lowest possible chance of recovery (not generally
zero).3
The properties of the two binomial distributions are given by the illness condi-
tion. The patient cannot choose the distribution under which to seek health care,
but she does have some control over the magnitude of health technology. The tech-
nology is generally a function of practitioner effort, practitioner skill, patient effort
and patient skill (the patient's efficiency at transforming health inputs into health).
An increase in any of these factors, ceteris paribus, increases the probability of
choosing the 'true diagnosis' distribution. The role of each of these factors will vary
according to the illness condition.
If the probability of cure under 'true diagnosis' is not much greater than the
probability of cure under 'false diagnosis' then the patient might decide not to invest
in any technology and just take her chances. On the other hand, if the difference is
great enough and she suffers from a condition that is easy to diagnose but requires a
therapeutic technique only available at one type of provider, she will know that the
greatest chance of recovery comes from a visit to that provider. Another condition
might indicate a range of diseases each of which is easily treated, but knowing which
therapy is correct would require the exertion of diagnostic effort. In this case the
patient will seek a provider who has incentives to exert effort.
3This description meets the Spanning Condition of Grossman and Hart (1983) and the Linear
Distribution Function Condition of Hart and Holmstrom (1987), which allows us to characterize
incentive compatibility constraints as first order conditions.
Unobservable efforts imply that the patient does not ever observe the technology
used in treatment; she only observes the outcome. Since both outcomes are possible
with all technologies the patient can never know physician effort even if she knows
her own level of effort, her own skill and the practitioner skill. In the example of a
condition that indicates a range of diseases all practitioners will make a diagnosis
from among these diseases but the patient cannot tell which is right and which is
wrong. The practitioner who exerted no diagnostic effort has a positive chance of
being correct, but the practitioner who did exert effort has a greater chance. Since
the exertion of effort causes disutility, patients can expect only effort compatible
with incentives. These incentives, in turn, are set by the contract for health care
provision from that provider. Patients can affect the technology of health care
through their choice of practitioner and their own level of effort.
Patient effort (either the sick individual or her family) is an important element
in medical treatment. Since the majority of this effort takes place out of sight of the
practitioner it is also unobservable to the other party in the contract. When patients
alone gain all the benefits and suffer all the cost of their subsequent health condition
they bear all of the risk and this unobservable effort is theoretically uninteresting.
But when they share risks with practitioners (as they do in contracts such as the
"pay only if cured" one) this effort and incentives for its provision can become
important.
Utility depends on the outcome, costs incurred and the disutility of the patient's
own effort. Costs can include fixed fees, contingent payments, drug expenses and
(importantly) travel costs. All of these factors will therefore be important in the
patient's choice of practitioner.
3 Solutions to the Principal—Agent Problem
The classic solution to the principal-agent problem is for the patient to pass on to
the agent the residual value of the production process. Thus, after fixed payments,
the agent/practitioner should be paid the full marginal value of medical effort to
the patient. He would then naturally equate his marginal effort with his marginal
costs and the full information solution (the solution that would be achieved in the
absence of imperfect information) would be achieved. In our case this would involve
the patient agreeing to pay the practitioner an amount that varied one for one with
her marginal utility. So a patient suffering from a headache would offer to pay the
practitioner a fee that would be larger if she was cured of her headache and smaller
if she was not. If the difference in payments with and without the cure equals the
value of the difference in utility the full information solution is achieved.
However, due to unobservable patient effort, we do not have the classic model
but rather a model of production in teams following Holmstrom (1982). This model
is more complicated and in general the full-information solution cannot be obtained.
If the patient pays the practitioner the full value of the change in her utility from
health then she is at exactly the same final level of utility at both outcomes. If she
were not, the contract would not have been the best contract. But if she is at the
same level of utility then what reason does she have to exert costly effort to change
the outcome? This is the core of the problem with moral hazard in teams — both
parties cannot face the full incentives at the same time.
Though we cannot achieve the full information solution we can do better with
some form of contract than with no contract.4 One such contract would be for the
patient and provider to share the value of the outcome. Rather than paying the
practitioner the full value of the change in utility the patient would pay some share
of that value. Then both principal and patient face an incentive to provide effort
— though not at full information levels.
3.1 Autonomous Outcome—Contingent Contracts
Leonard (1998a) has shown that traditional healers in rural Africa charge a nominal
initial fee and expect the bulk of their income to come from 'appreciation' pay-
ments by the patient after successful treatment. A random sample of households
in South-West Province of Cameroun found that patients cured of their ailments
made payments to traditional healers twice the size of payments made by patients
who were not cured. Payments made after the initial consultation were 3.6 times
higher when a patient was cured than when she was not. Payments to 'modern'
*For a proof of this proposition, see the appendix.
practitioners in contrast are higher in unsuccessful cases.
It is rare for a modern medical practitioner to make his fee contingent on the
outcome of treatment. On the other hand if fees are billed after the service is
provided, and practitioners know that their chances of collecting the fees are small if
the outcome of the treatment is a failure, the contract becomes a contingent payment
one, with the implied incentive effects to medical effort. We do not find this form of
contract among modern human health care providers in Africa. But we do find it in
private veterinary practice, where deferred fees are granted to livestock owners who
have no liquidity problems and clearly are using them to gain the benefits inherent
in a contingent contract (Kenya: D.K. Leonard, personal observation and G. Njiru,
personal communication).
3.2 Enforceability and Verifiable Outcomes
Though many aspects of effort are unobservable, we have claimed that outcomes
are observable. Unfortunately for most contracts in which payments are contingent
on the observation of outcome, outcomes need to be externally verifiable as well as
observable. When outcomes are not verifiable contracts are generally not enforceable
because the practitioner or the patient might refuse to honor the contract and no
outsider can verify which party is violating the contract. In the case of the contingent
payment contract introduced above, the patient is supposed to make an additional
payment to the practitioner if the outcome is good. However she no longer has an
incentive to make that payment if the outcome is not observed by any institution
that can enforce payment or punish lying. If the practitioner anticipates that a
contract is unenforceable, he will not accept it or will exert effort as if his incentives
were guided only by fixed payments. Since contingent-payment contracts reduce
agency costs, benefiting both practitioners and patients, the patient is hurt by her
ability to violate the contract. If she were able to bind herself to always tell the truth
or could utilize a technology that made outcomes verifiable she would be better off.
The success of the traditional healer contract depends on an exogenous feature
of the institution of traditional medicine. Most Africans believe that healers are the
agents of spiritual powers and it is these powers that have cured them. They believe
these powers cannot be deceived about the outcome and could revoke a cure, cause
a new illness or cause the death of the patient.5 Patients thus believe outcomes are
verifiable and this binds them to tell the truth. Modern medical practitioners could
never use such a mechanism to enforce contracts.
A modern medicine variant of the contingent contract was observed for mater-
nities in Cameroun (Ndeso-Atanga 1999). An informal convention has developed
in Cameroun that the family pay a substantial 'appreciation' to the mid-wife after
the successful delivery of a healthy child. This outcome is readily observable and
verifiable to all the parties to the transaction, and the payment is made before the
mother and child leave the clinic. The existence of a contract that creates incentives
for effort on the part of the mid-wife has dramatic effects. There is no doubt that
government hospitals and clinics in Cameroun have staff and facilities with a medi-
cal capacity equal to or greater than that of NGOs. For a whole range of illnesses,
however, substantial numbers of people go to missions because they believe that the
quality of effort exerted by their staff will be superior to that of their government
counterparts. Since the maternity contingent contract is able to induce that effort in
government clinics, however, the numbers of people going to missions for deliveries
is dramatically lower (3% of deliveries vs. 30% for other conditions).
This has important implications for privatization. In Africa the wide-spread use
of corruption often means that many services are de facto if not de jure privatized.
However, in health care, corruption is only a hurdle to access and does not lead
to increased quality. If health care did not suffer from asymmetric information
side-payments should lead to increased quality. Without verifiability this will not
happen.
3.3 Repeated Interaction
Though they are uncommon, there exist practitioners who provide high quality effort
despite the absence of incentives to do so. They might have a taste for exerting effort
or derive utility from service.6 With imperfect information, however, a practitioner
5For details of this institution see Leonard (1998a).
6The socialization literature, particularly for professionals, examines processes that seek to create
individuals who exert effort independent of direct incentives but the mechanisms have a high prob-
ability of success only when reinforced by other indirect incentives (Preidson 1970, Leonard 1991,
Chap. 12). There is no evidence that such indirect mechanisms operate effectively for government
and private medical practitioners in Africa.
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that is known to be extraordinary (as we shall refer to him) attracts more clients —
because they can count on his effort without observing it. Therefore potentially he
could earn a higher income. This higher income is not why he behaves as he does
but it is possible that an ordinary practitioner (one with distaste for effort) could
benefit by seeking to imitate an extraordinary practitioner. Thus reputation is the
changing beliefs of clients such that, correctly or incorrectly, patients believe a given
practitioner will always provide effort independent of direct incentives. Clients have
a prior belief about the probability that they are dealing with an 'extraordinary'
practitioner and this belief can be changed by observing the outcomes of many
interactions with the same practitioner.
If there was very little randomness in outcomes, 'good' and 'ordinary' practi-
tioners would be almost immediately distinguishable. However, when, (more re-
alistically) the difference in the probability of cure with the 'true diagnosis' and
'false diagnosis' is not great, it can take a large number of outcomes to distinguish
practitioners. Practitioners who practice in a limited geographical area can gain a
reputation when patients observe a long string of mostly positive outcomes from
treatments.7 When a practitioner arrives in an area that has no information about
his type he faces a choice either of acting rationally in the context of each interaction
or of forgoing current consumption, providing effort and hoping to gain a reputation.
His practice when he has a 'good' reputation must offer some reward that is worth
waiting for.
What is the benefit to a practitioner of imitation? The true, underlying, value of
visiting either an extraordinary or a 'good' practitioner is constant, but the expected
value is rising and falling with the patient's belief. The immediate effect of an
increase in the expected value is not necessarily an increase in the price that can be
charged, but an increase in the number of visits. Clients weigh the perceived value
of a visit against its cost, and as the value increases we expect more conditions
to meet the threshold condition to initiate a visit. This effect is clearly visible in
7This follows the model of reputation outlined by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and is in contrast to
the model of Satterthwaite (1979) and Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) in that, for us, the cost of
gathering information is zero. Their models examine the cost of gathering information when there
are differing numbers of practitioners. In our environment the number of practitioners is always
low.
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veterinary medicine. Ly (1999b) found that clients purchase more, and a greater
variety of services from practitioners in whom they have confidence than from other
practitioners.
When most practitioners are not extraordinary or good there is an investment
cost to trying to gain a reputation. Here we must take into account the fact that
setup costs for private practice in rural Africa are already seen as being too high,
especially in the absence of long-term credit markets. Mechanisms that insure qual-
ity and thus higher revenues without requiring large investment costs will naturally
be more attractive.
3.3.1 Repeated Interaction and Outcome—Contingent Contracts
As we have stated, contingent contracts with verifiable outcomes improve on the
solution obtained with only fixed payments. If a contingent-payment contract could
be sustained over repeated interactions even without verifiability, it is likely to
lead to superior outcomes both in the short and long run for both patient and
practitioner. There is a twist with sustaining contingent contracts when the patient
agrees to pay the practitioner upon the realization of a successful outcome; it is the
reputation of the patient that matters, not that of the practitioner. Under what
conditions does the patient have incentives to truthfully reveal unverifiable outcomes
even when it increases the payment she must make without increasing her utility
from treatment?
MacLeod and Malcomson (1982) observe that many contracts are written on
unverifiable outcomes and address our question.
[Pjiece rate [contingent] contracts are actually used, in many cases even
where the arrangements for recording output are sufficiently informal that
verifying it in court would be difficult. ... The fundamental requirement
for an implicit contract to be self-enforcing is that there exist sufficient
economic surplus from continuing it over what the parties can jointly get
if it is terminated.
Thus when the patient faces a more costly outside alternative to the relationship
with a particular practitioner she has an incentive to tell the truth. Recall that
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with observable but unverifiable outcomes the practitioner knows whether or not
the patient is telling the truth and can therefore refuse to do business (or refuse to
enter into certain types of contracts) with her in the future.
The enforceability of the contract with the possibility of repeated interactions
will depend on at least three things: the ability of the practitioner to identify
clients with their history of interactions; the client's probability of needing services
in the future; and the additional cost incurred in seeking an alternative practi-
tioner. These factors help to explain why we observe contingent-payment contracts
(deferred fees that cannot be collected when outcomes are bad) in use among vet-
erinarians but not among doctors. Veterinarians often enjoy a wider geographical
monopoly because transportation costs for animals are significantly higher than for
humans (Woods 1999, Leonard 1987). The reputation is attached to a herder but
each herder represents a large number of animals which could fall sick, increasing
the likelihood of future visits as well as making identification of clients easier for
vets. Human medicine practitioners see a larger number of clients per case, and
their client can more easily find alternative providers. This helps explain why we
do not observe such contracts in health care.
3.4 Budget-Breaking Incentive Systems
Autonomous contracts can be formed without the direct intervention of the state
or other outside organizations, but they rely on exogenous circumstances or sub-
stantial investment. However, in most types of medical transactions outcomes are
not verifiable and repeated interaction cannot offer enough long-term benefit. Are
there institutional mechanisms that can assure effort in these, more typical circum-
stances? We examine in this section institutions that allow enforcement of contracts
without verifiability.
The patient lies when payment is required in an unverifiable contingent-payment
contract because after the outcome is observed payment can only decrease her utility.
Consider instead that there are two transfers, not one; a payment from patients and
a receipt by practitioners. The payment received by the practitioner depends on
the declaration of the patient, but the payment made by the patient depends on
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the declaration of the practitioner.8 This requires a third party who can add or
remove money when these two payments do not match. Now the statement of the
patient does not change her utility. She gets the value of the outcome and makes
a payment that depends only on the practitioner's declaration. She has no reason
to lie, and if we assume a mild propensity to tell the truth she will tell the truth.9
By similar logic the practitioner is induced to tell the truth. Now the outcome will
be known and payments can be made appropriately. Thus even with unverifiable
outcomes, if (but only if) the budget does not have to be balanced a contract can be
implemented that makes payment contingent on outcome. Furthermore since both
patient and practitioner can face the full marginal value of health when budgets are
broken, the full information solution can be achieved.
Once a budget is broken implementation of outcome-contingent contracts with-
out verifiability is just the beginning of the types of contracts that can be introduced.
Breaking budgets introduces the possibility that payments can be made not just on
different statements about the outcome of one process, but on statements about the
outcome of different signals.
3.4.1 Correlated Signals
With the contract outlined above payments to patients are easy to make. If a patient
makes a fixed payment at the beginning of treatment and then returns home, she will
automatically gain the value of outcome, since this is just her own health. The third
party does not need to find the patient in order to pay the patient, but the patient
must be located and polled in order to make the practitioner's payment. However,
in some circumstances, it is not necessary that the payment to the practitioner be
tied to the outcome of treatment. Any signal will achieve the same solution if it is
correlated with the outcome of treatment and is verifiable, such that a contract can
8In the general literature these mechanisms are referred to as Groves mechanisms (Clarke 1971,
Groves 1973). The role of budget-breaking in multiple agent problems was advanced by Holmstrom
(1982). Budget-breaking is also cited as a mechanism for insurance companies to reduce the costs
of moral hazard in insurance by Ellis and McGuire (1990, pp 377).
9This mild propensity to tell the truth has bothered other writers (it is a weakly dominant
strategy) and other solutions have been proposed, namely Nash implementation. Thus if the dec-
laration of both parties is in agreement then the original contract must be fulfilled according to
the declaration but if they disagree then both are penalized. Agreement on the truth is therefore
a Nash equilibrium: however, so is agreement on a lie (Moore 1992). The reality of the contracts
actually observed makes these distinctions less important.
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be written that leads to the same incentives for the practitioner. For example, if
the practitioner is paid, not on the basis of each outcome, but on the outcome of
a randomly selected treatment from among a series of treatments, payments to the
practitioner can be designed such that he faces the same incentives. The outcome
of the selected treatment is still not verifiable, but since payments to that patient
do not depend on her declaration the contract is implementable.
This is an important modification to the class of potential contracts. Despite the
fact that with broken budgets patients can be induced to tell the truth, there are
significant transaction costs to gathering information about outcomes. Outcomes are
frequently not known until well after the administration of treatment, and patients
have generally returned home by this point. The presence of transaction costs means
that organizations face a trade-off between correlation with outcomes and cost of
collection.
Budget-breaking institutions use signal technologies to reduce transaction costs
but any technology available to an organization is also available to an individual
practitioner or an organization that does not break budgets. Polling a random
patient about the outcome would greatly reduce the cost of gathering information
about outcomes, but would not be implementable because this outcome is still un-
verifiable. The patients declaration will influence her payment because budgets are
balanced and she will therefore have an incentive to misrepresent the outcome.
Though observed institutions use both budget-breaking and correlated signals,
we suggest that the comparative advantage of organizational provision comes in
their ability to break budgets. The existing and potential institutions we discuss
below differ in many aspects of their practices but all break budgets and collect
correlated signals rather than direct information about outcomes.
3.5 Practitioner—Coordinated Contracts
There are many ways to break a budget. For example, the practitioner could form a
side-contract on outcomes with other practitioners that would break the symmetry
between payments and receipts. The main contract is a balanced one between
patient and practitioner, but if the practitioner violates the side-contract he will
loose some large stock of value such as his relationship with other practitioners
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or his right to practice. The value of this asset is not collected by the patient or
by other practitioners and therefore the side-contract and the main contract are
not balanced. Self-regulation and referral networks are examples of these types of
side-contracts.
3.5.1 Self-Regulation
Many countries rely upon self-regulation by professional associations to provide
quality-assured medical care. These not only control licenses but hospital privi-
leges as well. Since professionals gain from credibly committing to provide quality
care, they gain by the creation of such an organization. They can do so because
practitioners can asses the quality of work done by their peers better than patients
can.
Due in part to very small private markets and in part to statist traditions, pro-
fessional self-regulation has been quite weak in Africa north of Zimbabwe. The
agency literature on health predicts that as private medical markets emerge profes-
sional associations should become strong regulators so as to enable their members
to collect the higher prices the market would pay for the assurance of quality effort
(Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985, pp. 19-29; Arrow 1963, 1985, pp. 38, 40). Ly (1999a)
examined this hypothesis among veterinarians in Senegal for our project. There
was a special reason to expect that professional self-regulation would emerge for
full doctors of veterinary medicine (DVMs) in that country - the down-sizing of
the state had forced large numbers of veterinary practitioners into the market and
the political power of the union representing veterinary para-professionals had won
them the legal right to practice in competition with DVMs. Full vets therefore had a
particularly strong need to convince the livestock producer that paying a premium
for their services would purchase higher quality. DVMs did create a professional
body that gained state recognition, but they have not made a meaningful effort to
regulate one another. Ly concludes that the agency literature underestimated the
collective action problem of such regulation. There is a premium to self-regulation
but it is gained by all members of the profession. The creation of the necessary
mechanism would require a level of effort from leading DVMs that would exceed the
benefits they personally would obtain.
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Prance and large parts of Africa use state regulation as a proxy for self-regulation.
In theory the extended powers of the government can provide the same regulation
while avoiding the pitfalls caused by voluntary agreements. However, the same
governmental incompetence and corruption that makes privatization attractive to
Africa renders the state unreliable as a regulator.
3.5.2 Referral Networks
Referral networks fulfill much the same function as self-regulation by professional
associations but in an informal and less costly manner. They are the mechanism
whereby most real professional self-regulation and quality enhancement takes place
in the United States (Freidson 1970, Savage 1997). Because medical personnel are
better trained to understand the nature of one another's work and because they see
many more examples of the outcomes of their colleagues' treatments, they are in
a much better position to overcome the imperfect information problem of medicine
than is the average patient. Thus if frequent interaction teaches the patient that
their primary care physician provides a quality of care that they regard as satis-
factory, they can use that MD's referrals to find other medical providers of similar
quality. Haas-Wilson (1990) shows that (for psychotherapy services) referred practi-
tioners earn higher fees, a result compatible with the idea that referrals benefit both
practitioner and patient. Ly (1999b) did observe such a network between a DVM
and para-vets created by a mission in Senegal's Ferlo. The result of the assurance of
quality that comes from a well-functioning referral network was at least a doubling
in herder purchase of preventive treatments from para-vets.
Referral networks are not generally present in African health systems. There
seem to be several reasons why this is so. First patients very often self-refer to
higher-level facilities and thus do not allow referral networks to function (Sauerborn
et al. 1989). This may be the result, however, not the cause of absent networks.
Second, when referrals are made they are made to facilities, not to particular practi-
tioners. Given the depersonalized character of these relationships, there is very little
communication among medical practitioners about the cases they have shared. Thus
little information is generated that might teach personnel about one another's qual-
ity. Third, the sharing of knowledge (both about medicine and about one another)
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takes place most effectively through informal and frequent personal interactions.
Large numbers of professional staff are working in isolation, practitioners in clinics
don't have hospital privileges, and rural hospitals tend to have very small profes-
sional staffs. Until medical professionals in Africa interact more with one another,
in non-hierarchical settings, and with the possibility of personalized referrals, the
professional networks that recognize, reward and encourage quality are not likely to
emerge.
3.6 Hierarchically-Enforced Contracts
We suggest that breaking a budget is an important role of any organization that
employs practitioners. These organizations observe signals correlated with outcomes
and then make payments to practitioners that help to align incentives.
3.6.1 Organizational Quality
The technology of information collection most commonly observed in Africa and
throughout the world is direct monitoring of the practitioner. The employer of the
practitioner does not seek to know the outcome of treatment but does observe other
signals that give information about the effort of the provider. Practitioners produce
both health for the patient and what we call organizational quality. This second
output is observed by the employer. Records are kept of the various activities that
go into producing health. Typically a selection of records are examined during
a site visit. The patients' symptoms and complaints are part of all records and
therefore procedures and records should follow protocols developed for each set of
complaints. If a particular record or collection of records is determined to be in
violation of standards, the practitioner is punished in accordance with the gravity
of the deviation. (One of the major steps forward in assuring medical quality in the
US was the creation of the Joint Commission of Medical Accreditation standards
for medical records (Savage 1997, Langlois and Savage 1997)).
Organizational quality is a measure specifically designed to be highly correlated
with outcomes. It does, however, include some information that is deliberately dif-
ferent from outcomes. For example, prescribing too many drugs (poly-pharmacy)
decreases organizational quality but usually does not affect individual health out-
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comes. Organizations monitor this activity in an attempt to 'internalize' the ex-
ternality imposed by excessive use, for example, of antibiotics. On the other hand,
organizational quality ignores patient effort. Examination of records would show
that correct diagnostic procedures were used and that correct medicines were pre-
scribed but they would be unable to show whether or not the patient took her
medicines correctly. Thus a practitioner evaluated on the basis of organizational
quality will be less likely to encourage patient effort than a practitioner evaluated
on the basis of outcomes.
This prediction is confirmed by the results of observations of 450 consultations in
both church and government health facilities in Tanzania (Leonard 1998a). In only
16% of observations (17% at government and 11% at NGO facilities) did the doctor
tell the patient what the diagnosis was or what medicine was being prescribed. In
only 6% of cases (7% at government and 5% at NGO) did the doctor inform the
patient of any activity she could undertake to increase the chance of recovery or to
avoid a similar illness in the future. Of cases in which a dispensing nurse gave the
patient drugs requiring that the patient know how or when to take the drug in only
32% (38% at government and 30% at NGO) did the nurse check to see if the patient
had any idea how to do so. Despite the emphasis these organizations put on health
education, organizational quality does not create strong incentives to encourage
patient effort. Furthermore, although there is strong evidence that missions provide
more unobservable effort they do not address patient effort significantly more than
government facilities.
We stated earlier that any signal available to one type of provider should, in
theory be available to all providers. The signal used by organizational providers is
verifiable and therefore seems to circumvent the previous problems that we claimed
faced private providers. Is breaking a budget necessary for the implementation of
this contract or can private providers use this signal to implement organizational
quality-contingent contracts? In this case the patient would visit a provider and her
payment to that provider would depend on the degree to which his actions conformed
to protocols. She would sometimes pay more for a protocol adhering treatment and
not be cured and sometime she might pay less for a protocol violating treatment and
be cured, but on average her payment should correspond to the expected outcome.
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The problem with this contract is transaction costs. It takes a doctor to evaluate
protocols and organizations do not have monitors present at each consultation, they
evaluate randomly selected treatments after the fact. A patient cannot take her own
private monitor with her when she visits the doctor: if such a monitor existed she
would be unlikely to need a doctor at all. A private practitioner could contract with
an outside monitor to credibly punish him if he violates protocols. This is no longer
a balanced budget (since the punishment would not be gained by patients), but is
implementable. This contract with an outside monitor will be discussed in Section
4 when we look at franchise relationships between NGOs and private practitioners.
4 Evidence and Policy Prescriptions for NGOs
A great number of the potential solutions that we have examined rely on institu-
tions like courts or strong professional associations or exogenous characteristics for
enforceability or reputation. Most of Africa therefore lacks institutional structures
that would solve the imperfect information problem for medical markets as a whole.
The problem can be and is resolved within the context of specific organizations with
hierarchical supervision. Government and NGO health systems are therefore play-
ers within the institution we call organizational provision. Both governments and
missions collect information on organizational quality, but government health sys-
tems fail to take advantage of their institutional context. Hierarchical supervision
in government does not function effectively, as it is too difficult to fire practitioners
for deficiencies, the personnel systems are either too bureaucratic or too politicized
to reward good performance, and supervisors have too little incentive to overcome
the inertia of the system.
Hierarchical supervision does work effectively to assure quality effort in NGO
facilities, however. This is an area in which Africa has a readily available, highly-
functional institution for dealing with moral hazard.
4.1 Empirical Evidence
It is very clear that most NGO health facilities have a strong market position in
most African countries and that many people are prepared to pay a premium over
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government facility charges in order to use them. This quality premium cannot
be due to superior mission capacity, for staff qualifications and equipment in NGO
facilities typically is equal to or worse than those in their government counter-
parts (Mliga 1999, Leonard 1999). It could be due, however, to aspects of observable
effort, such as better drug supplies and superior 'clinical manner' (Mliga 1999, Bich-
mann et al. 1991, Litvack and Bodart 1993, Omorodion 1993, Stock 1983, Wadding-
ton and Enyimayew 1989). To demonstrate that mission facilities also are attractive
because they help to solve the moral hazard problem, we need to show that a patient
is most likely to chose one of them as her agent when she knows that unobservable
dimensions of quality of medical effort, and not just capacity and observable aspects
of effort, are desirable for her particular medical condition.
4.1.1 Self—Diagnosis and the Choice between Providers
We have noted earlier that Africans are making choices between medical providers
based on their own understanding of their illnesses. Here we draw on evidence that
their choices follow patterns that would be predicted by the theory of asymmetric
information advanced in this paper and therefore offer empirical support for our
conclusions
If medical effort were observable patients would seek providers who had the
appropriate skill at the lowest cost and then insure that the necessary effort was ex-
erted. Government-run facilities are clearly the least expensive in terms of fees, drug
costs and travel costs for the majority of patients. Therefore, if skills, capacity and
drug supplies are adequate at government facilities, we would expect to see patients
visiting government clinics and being referred to government hospitals when neces-
sary, or, if the delay was substantial, self-referring to government hospitals. Visits
to mission clinics or hospitals would occur only when the difference in travel costs
was such that it was less expensive to visit mission clinics or hospitals. However,
in a study undertaken in Cameroun, deliberately chosen to coincide with a donor
project to insure adequate drug supply at government operated clinics and hospitals
we found no evidence of patterns of visits along these lines (Leonard 1999, Ndeso-
Atanga 1999). Seventy-nine percent of all visits were to a provider who was not the
closest one. Of the visits to clinics and hospitals only 53% were to the closest clinic
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or hospital. Of visits to hospitals 39% involved patients traveling past a government
hospital to visit a mission hospital.
If some elements of effort are unobservable then different patterns of visits can
emerge. We have stated that the contingent-payment contract of the traditional
healer fails to achieve the full information solution, though it is an improvement
on treatment without contracts. The contract available at organizational providers
can potentially be superior to that of the traditional healer since it breaks budgets,
but the fact that organizational quality does not take into account the role of the
patient means that it will not, in general, achieve the first best solution. We have
developed a model of illness conditions as production technologies that differ in the
degree to which they require unobservable inputs from medical practitioners and
patients. With it we can show that different forms of contracts are appropriate for
different diseases.
Mwabu (1986) examines the patterns of diseases reported at different providers
using cluster analysis and finds significant patterns across illness conditions. Leonard
(1998b) quantifies this analysis using medically assessed values for the benefit of un-
observable medical and patient effort and skill than can be used in a production
function. By creating explicit representations of the contracts discussed above and
estimating some of their parameters he matched predicted patterns of patient behav-
ior to observed patterns. Leonard (1998b) estimates that practitioners in mission
facilities face penalties over 50% greater than government practitioners for the same
violation of protocol and that this fact helps explain the patient choice to by-pass
government facilities when they suffer from conditions that require high levels of
unobservable effort.
The results of this and other empirical investigations (Leonard 1998a) suggest
that the patterns observed are in part explained by the contracts available at dif-
ferent providers. Patients are aware of the incentive effects of various institutional
structures and act accordingly.
4.2 Policies for the Extension of Institutional Capacity
If NGOs play a unique role in the provision of health care, as it would appear that
they do, is there any way to systematically take advantage of this fact? At the very
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least NGOs should not be unnecessarily deterred from expanding there role, but
are there ways of encouraging this expansion? Below we discuss empirical evidence
from two possible expansion schemes.
4.2.1 Franchising an NGO Brand Name
The Tanzanian government banned all private practice in 1977 and gave private
practitioners the choice of joining the government service or joining the practices
of voluntary organizations. In effect they could keep their practice if any religious
organization agreed to serve as their sponsor and "practitioners retained owner-
ship of the facility and paid voluntary organizations a commission for using their
names." (Kanji, Kilima and Munishi 1992, pg. 9) Even as strictures against pri-
vate practice were loosened the tax exemption offered to NGOs meant that private
practitioners continued to seek these relationships.
The government therefore recognized and implicitly encouraged a franchise re-
lationship between NGOs and private practitioners. This franchising should have
lead to the extension of the institutional capacity of NGOs. Bearing the name of an
established NGO a private practitioner could forgo the up-front costs of establishing
a reputation, while the NGO could provide quality-assured services at a very low
cost, using their capacity for regulation to expand the reach of their organization.
However a 1992 study on quality of clinics in Dar-es-Salaam (Kanji et al. 1992)
found that these hypothetical hopes were not realized. Out of 70 clinics regis-
tered under the name of religious organizations only 15 were found to have any real
relationship with an NGO. The others were private practitioners associated with or-
ganizations that did not operate any facilities on their own. Religious organizations
with any self-run clinics did not sell their name to private practitioners. Thus it
would appear that a religious organization would either sell its name or provide its
own services, but never both at the same time.
These findings imply that the franchising we observe in Tanzania is only an
attempt to get a license or avoid paying taxes but not a method to extend reputa-
tions. Furthermore established religious organizations have not shown any desire to
extend their services using this method. It is common in Africa for an established
NGO hospital to open 'annexes' in geographically remote locations. In Cameroun,
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for example, whenever this is done the annex will bear the name of the hospital.
Mbingo Baptist hospital and Mbingo annex are at least 150 miles apart and in dif-
ferent provinces; they bear the same name specifically because the parent institution
enjoys a wide-spread reputation from which the 'annex' can immediately benefit.
However, annexes remain under the hierarchical control of the parent whereas regu-
lation of a franchised private provider would require management expertise outside
of the hierarchy. It would appear that NGOs are reluctant to assume this different
regulatory role.
4.2.2 Contracting Government Services out to NGO's
A number of African governments contract out health services to NGOs and some
private health systems. For example, in Zimbabwe a mining company was paid to
open up its company hospital to the entire local population (Mills 1997). Gilson
et al. (1997) discuss the experience of Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ghana in which
mission health services were contracted to run designated district hospitals. These
contracts are not put up for tender in the classic sense; there is no bidding or
competition and there is limited monitoring of the service providers. The limited
evidence about these experiments (the study of mission hospitals compared those
hospitals to matched government hospitals) suggests that the contractors provide the
same or higher level of service as the government at lower cost, though the results are
mixed. These differences might be due to greater flexibility in the type of personnel
hired, the ability to hire and fire and the discretion to shift money between budget
categories. Additionally, "[tjhere are clear signs that, as is commonly assumed of
NGOs, the church hospitals studied were motivated to provide good quality care,
and did not abuse the resources made available to them" (Gilson et al. 1997, pp
295). However, there is little in-depth comparison of quality in terms of outcomes
or patient perceptions rather than ours.
Mills (1997) suggests that competition for such contracts might improve out-
comes, as lower cost providers would be more likely to win. However, given the
limited success of privatization, is the least cost provider likely to deliver quality
services? Though we have stated that NGOs generally provide high quality ser-
vices it would be a mistake to claim that all NGOs always provide high quality
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services. Whether or not competitive bidding will reduce costs without reducing
quality is likely to depend on some of the following factors. If the winner is to pro-
vide services in which the bulk of their revenue depends on patient fees they prefer
more, not less patients. Of the above mentioned church providers one hospital in
Ghana received 40% of its income in fees. However, the other 5 received almost
all of their income directly from the government. We would expect the Ghanaian
hospital to work harder to attract patients. This suggests an interesting implica-
tion; NGO organizations with wide-spread reputations for high quality services will
attract more patients and collect more fees than those with no reputation. They
therefore, might be able to out-bid competitors without any other cost advantage.
In this case competitive bidding could select only higher quality providers.
On the other hand, it is not the case that low quality providers attract no
patients. Government clinics and hospitals continue to attract patients and we have
seen that private providers in Kenya, for example, thrive on the sale of observable
goods and services. A low quality organization would run a hospital differently than
a high quality organization and would attract a different mix of custom, but it is
not clear that it would earn less revenue. Market discipline does not have the same
implications in a market with imperfect information.
In each of the cases of mission subcontracting, the churches supplemented hos-
pital income with their own funds. The winners of the contracts clearly had some
personal interest in the provision of health services and were not seeking profit. A
for-profit provider would not have agreed to these contracts. It would seem that
contracting in this context is a government subsidy for NGO services. The NGO
had a desire to provide the services; the government has simply made it less ex-
pensive for them to do so. Rather than giving money directly the government has
given a subsidy that is contingent on the expansion of service provision. These find-
ings suggest that the relationship between the government and NGO providers of
health services is better thought of as a long-term partnership than a low cost way
to contract out services.
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5 Conclusion
There are many potential solutions to the problems of asymmetric information in
African health care. In fact we observe many of these solutions at work in Africa.
However, most of the standard solutions do not function, mostly because of the
absence of 'macro' institutions like effective government regulation or a functioning
court system. Even those solutions that we do observe at work in Africa (such as
traditional healers and child-birth appreciation contracts) are often severely con-
strained by the scope of the institution.
This lack of institutions is a direct factor in the limited success of private health
practices on the continent. However, NGOs to provide extensive, popular and high
quality services in Africa. It should come as no surprise that these service organiza-
tions want to provide these services. But their success should be contrasted to the
failure of governments that also want to provide high quality services. This work
shows how NGOs transform their organizational objectives into practitioner level
incentives in an environment of asymmetric information.
They differ from private practitioners in their ability to break the budget of value
created when a patient is treated. Since practitioners can be rewarded or punished
in ways other than payments from patients their utility can be made dependent
on measures correlated with outcomes. Private practitioners could not implement
such contracts because outcomes of health care are not generally verifiable. Thus
we find that private practitioners specialize in observable services and goods and
only missions are left providing the vast array of services that require unobservable
efforts.
The goal of all African countries is to increase the availability of quality-assured
health care. It had been widely hoped that allowing private health care practice
would help cash-strapped governments achieve this goal. This has not happened.
Policy makers should recognize and embrace NGO providers as a unique and pre-
existing institution for the delivery of high quality health care.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.I The Value of Health Care
The level of health is H. Health intervention leads to a change in the level of health,
AH. There are only two possible outcomes; the worst outcome AH — h and the
best outcome AH = h. These outcomes depend only on the disease condition and
not on any characteristics of the patient or the practitioner he visits. The probability
of achieving either outcome is determined by two binomial distributions. 0* is the
'true diagnosis' distribution and 00 is the 'false diagnosis' distribution. With the
'true diagnosis' distribution the probability of recovery is p*. If the diagnosis is
incorrect the probability of recovery is p . The probability of failing to recover is
(1 — p*) with the 'true diagnosis' and (1 — p0) with the 'false diagnosis.'
Health care is a set of technologies that probabilistically span 0* and 00. A
'better' technology is one that has a higher probability of choosing the 'correct
diagnosis' distribution than another technology. We represent the technology by e
(0 < e < 1) where
AH ~ e • 0* + (1 - e) • / (1)
We model utility following Grossman (1975) and consider health as increasing the
hours of time available to consume work and leisure as well as augmenting utility
directly. Thus U = (H, I(H), d(p)), where d(p) is the disutility of patient effort and
I(H) is the income potential at health level H.
The expected value of health is
EU = ep* • U[h, (I(h) - C), d(p)} + e(l - p*) • U[h, (I(h) - C), d{p)] +
- e)p0 • U[h, (I(h) - C), d{p)] 4- (1 - e)(l - p«) • U\h, (I(h) - C), d(p)\ (2)
where C is the total cost of a visit. Of interest to the patient is the change in
expected utility. We choose as a natural comparison the utility when no health care
is sought. We assume a separable utility form such that U — U'[H, I(H)} — C — d(p).
Although income and total costs are measured in the same units and need not be
separated we choose this formulation for the following reasons. The income (or
earning potential of the patient) and health level for good outcomes is the same
whether the patient sought health care or not; it depends on the outcome, not the
process. Thus the part of utility inside the utility operator (U'[H,I(H)]) does not
depend on the practitioner chosen or effort exerted. Costs and disutility have a
linear relation to utility. This is reasonable because, although utility may exhibit
decreasing marginal utility of income, the change in utility caused by exerting effort
or paying medical costs is small enough so as to be approximated in a linear fashion.
Patients are not risk neutral over health outcomes, but for tractability we claim that
the marginal utility of income is constant over effort and costs. For ease of exposition
we write U'[h,I(Ji)} as U' and U'[h,I{h)] as U'.
The expected utility when no medical care is sought (e — 0) can be expressed as
Using the separable utility function the expected utility of seeking care at provider
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j is
EUj = (e(p* - p0) + p0) tf' + (1 - p0 + e(p0 - p*)) £/' - C - d(p) (2')
The change in the expected utility is
AEUj = e(p* - p0) • (U' -U!)-C- d{p) (4)
At this point we make a number of further simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that U_' is equal to zero, a simple scaling assumption. Furthermore we assume that
utility from health comes from a fixed health affect, h • CD (where u is the per unit
value of health) and an increased amount of time for leisure or work, h • w (where w
is the opportunity cost of healthy time.) We cannot separate these two effects and
therefore use the combination of effects, h • u (where u — u> + w.) Thus
AEUj = e(p* - p®)ujh - C - d{p)
Without loss of generality we define the technology for health production as being a
standard production function divided by a 'maximum' level of production for that
function, e = h/h. Thus where e varies between 0 and 1, h varies between 0 and h.
AEUj = ip* - p®)uh - C - dip)
For simplicity of exposition we replace (p* — p®)uh with h'.
A.2 The Health Production Technology
We view the health production technology (e) as a search for the proper treatment
regime. This search however is a complex function of a number of different inputs;
a production function of health. We assume the following factors are important in
the production of health; medical effort, patient effort, medical skill and patient
efficiency at transforming health inputs into health. An increase in any of these
factors, ceteris paribus increases the probability of choosing the 'true diagnosis'
distribution. The role of each of these factors will vary according to the illness
condition. Generally h = / ( ra ,p, ipk, ipj,ipi) where m is the effort of the practitioner,
p the effort of the patient, ipk characteristics of the illness condition 4>k characteristics
of the practitioner, and ipi characteristics of the patient, k is the illness index, j the
practitioner index and i the individual index;
Payments to health care practitioners differ across providers but can involve fixed
fees (paid before a consultation), an outcome-contingent fee (paid after the outcome
is observed) and drug costs. Traditional healers charge a fixed fee and negotiate with
the patient over a final payment to be made if the patient is cured. We assume this
payment depends on the value of the outcome and can therefore be expressed as a
share of the value created when the patient is cured, ruh. Traditional healers do
not charge for drugs. Organizational providers charge a fixed fee for consultation
and charge for all drugs administered.
Expected utility for patient i, treated at provider j for illness condition k is
AEUijk = (1- r)ti -Cf-Cd-Ct- dip) (5)
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Costs are composed of fixed fees (C/), drug costs (Cd) and travel costs (Ct). The
travel cost is a function of the individual (origin) and the practitioner visited (des-
tination), the drug cost is a function of the practitioner and the disease, and the
fixed cost is a function only of the practitioner, r = 0 for all providers except the
traditional healer. The income of the practitioner is the sum of all payments by the
patient, not including travel costs.
In the specification we have introduced, the patient and the traditional healer
both have incentives to exert effort, so although effort cannot be purchased in a
perfect market, a contract exists for its provision. The provision of effort on the
part of government and mission health centers is not quite as obvious.
g(m, il>k,j)=p-k (Ql - Q{m, tpk)) (6)
where tph are characteristics of the disease, p is the probability, for any given orga-
nization, of a record being examined and k is the baseline penalty for organization.
p and k cannot be identified separately thus we refer to the product as K.
We can construct the utility of the practitioner (who is risk neutral) and see
that both traditional healers and providers at government and mission clinics have
incentives to exert effort.
) = rh'{m,p^)+CU/+ Cf -g(m^kJ) - c(m) (7)
contingent fee drugs fixed fee penalty disutility
Only the healer has a non-zero share and drug costs are received only by organiza-
tional providers. Note that no providers receive the travel costs.
A.3 Production in Teams with Unobservable Effort
The interaction between patients and practitioners is based on the principle-agent
model of production in teams advanced by Holmstrom (1982). Increases in health
stock are produced by the joint effort of two agents; the patient and the practitioner.
These two players form the team. We introduce a third player, the super-principal,
who declares incentive-compatible efforts for both agents and pays them according
to a contract. The super-principal does not exert effort but has the task of inter-
preting the information that she receives and executing the contract according to
this information. The super-principal maximizes the expected utility of the patient
subject to total cost and the participation constraint of the practitioner. Note that
all actions must be incentive compatible, even the actions of the patient. Thus the
problem can be represented as
=(1~ r)h' -Cf-Cd-Ct- d{p) - T (S. P. utility) (8)
subject to
m* € aTg^rh' + Cf + Cd- g(m) - c(m) + T (I.C. medical) (9)
p* € arg™ax (1 - r)ti -Cf-Cd-Ct- d{p) (I.C. patient) (10)
rti+ Cf + Cd-c(m)-g(m) + T = Vm (I.R. medical) (11)
(1 - r)h' -Cf-Cd-Ct- d(p) > Vp (I.R. patient) (12)
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where T is the transfer from the super-principal to the practitioner, Vp is the reser-
vation utility of the patient and Vm is the reservation utility of the practitioner. The
practitioner's individual rationality constraint (I.R.) is binding and we can therefore
substitute it into the super-principal's objective function. We have justified the use
of the relaxed incentive compatibility (I.C.) constraints by the choice of distribution
for h and we get:
= h'-Ct- d{p) - c(m) - Vm (80
i • / dh \ dc(m) dg(m) . .,
subject to Mir-) ~ ~^—L ~ -sr-T = ° 9
dm dm o(m)
(1 - r)h' -Cf-Cd-Ct- d{p) > Vp (12')
A.4 Balanced budge ts
We begin by considering the case of the interaction between the patient and a
traditional healer; K = 0. The full information solution (where 9' and 10' do not
bind) is the point where the marginal benefit of effort is equal to its marginal cost;
But the super-principal can only require effort compatible with the incentives of the
practitioner and the patient as defined by the incentive compatibility constraints
equations 9' and 10'. 9' and 10' are equal to 13 and 14 if r = (1 — r) — 1,
clearly never true. When the payments to the patient and the practitioner must
always sum to the value of the output (a 'balanced budget') then the share payment
cannot achieve the first best solution.
Proposition 1 A contingent contract with balanced budgets cannot achieve the full
information solution in the case of both unobservable patient and practitioner effort.
Proof is above.
Given that the full information solution is not obtainable, is the introduction of
a sharing rule an improvement over the solution without a sharing rule?
Proposition 2 With unobservable efforts as above and balanced budgets any shar-
ing rule 0 < r < 1 gives a solution strictly superior to either r — 0 or r = 1.
For proof see bellow.
We cannot achieve the first-best solution with a sharing rule but we can improve
on the solution that would obtain without a sharing rule.
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If the super-principal is an actual entity she can inject or remove value from
the game; the payments do not need to sum to the total value. By breaking the
budget balance the super-principal can achieve the first best solution to the game.
Instead of a sharing rule {rm,rp}, where rp = 1 — rm, choose rp = 1 and rm — 1.
Examining again equations 9' and 10' it should be clear that such a rule will achieve
the first best solution. Note that the super-principal can then extract the expected
value of these payments from the two parties without changing either incentive
compatibility constraint. This is not a balanced budget because, though the sum
of payments might be equal to the total value in expectation and on equilibrium
paths, they do not equal the total value off the equilibrium path.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The Lagrangian is formed as follows;
Using the envelope condition we solve for the change in utility with respect to a
change in the sharing rule.
dL dh' dh'
or dm op
differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to a and b we solve for the two
multipliers.
dh' dc , x d2ti x (d2ti \ _
_
1
 ~ rd2ti _ d2c
dm2 dm2
which then leads to an expression of A2.
dh' _dd _ (dh' _ dc\ K9™9?,
dp op y dm dm J o2h' 92c
\ _ _ V dm2 ~&^?
' I dp1
\ T dm2 dm2
Note that
dh' dd _ dh'
dp dp dp
and it should be clear that ^rar_>o^2 = 0. This makes sense since all of the incentives
to provide effort lie with the patient when the sharing rule is equal to zero the cost
of the incentive compatibility constraint is smaller and smaller. However Ai does
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not go to zero as r goes to zero.
dh!




This condition is positive given that there are increasing marginal costs to effort.
Note that the system is not solvable if this is not the case. Thus as rapproaches
zero there is a benefit to increasing r. Note that this does not rely on any assump-
tions about the sign of the cross partial of output with respect to m and p. With
unobservable efforts some output sharing between patients and practitioners leads
to a strictly superior expected outcome.
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